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L’important n’est pas pour moi de pasticher Finnegans Wake—on sera 
toujours en dessous de la tâche—, c ’est de dire en quoi, je donne à Joyce,  
en formulant ce titre, Joyce le symptôme, rien de moins que son nom propre, 
celui où je crois qu’il se serait reconnu dans la dimension de la nomination. 
What is important to me is not to pastiche Finnegan’s Wake—one will always 
be inferior to the task—but to say how I give to Joyce, in formulating this title, 
Joyce the Symptom, nothing less than his proper name, a name in which, I 
believe, he would have recognised himself in the dimension of nomination. 
Jacques Lacan, “Joyce le Symptôme” (Lacan 1975, session of 20.6.1975). 
“We have learnt to see Joyce as Lacan’s own symptom,” writes Jean-Michel 
Rabaté, “and as the sinthome par excellence” (2006, 26). !is duality of Joyce as 
an unreadable text permeated with enjoyment and at the same time as an enigma 
that Lacan wants to decipher supplies the key to an understanding of Seminar 
XXIII. Lacan’s addition to the triad of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary 
of a fourth term, the x (or sinthome) "rms up his late shift from the speakingbe-
ing (parlêtre, the Lacanian neologism that indicates the insertion of the human 
being into the signifying chain) to MAN (LOM, a Lacanian play on l’homme). 
Instead of the human being as inserted into the Symbolic Order, Seminar XXIII 
presents Joyce as inserting himself into language, tying the signi"er to the body in 
a special, unique way. For Lacan, the sinthome is eccentric to the registers of the 
Real, Symbolic and Imaginary, yet it paradoxically links them when the Name-
of-the-Father fails. !e implication is carried in the concept of “nomination” that 
the Name-of-the-Father (or its structural equivalents, such as “Woman,” “God” 
and “Joyce”) makes language possible for the individual. 
Lacan’s "nal complete seminar on Joyce represents a last, convulsive revi-
sion of the entire corpus of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Prompted by an invitation to 
speak at an international Joyce conference by leading French Joyce scholar, Jacques 
Aubert, Lacan turned the seminar of 1975-1976 into an exploration of the ques-
tions raised by the paper delivered the previous year. Rabaté’s comment sums up the 
"ndings of a torrent of recent scholarship on what is perhaps Lacan’s most perplex-
ing seminar. !anks to this material, we can now draw some conclusions about the 
status and implications of Lacan’s Seminar XXIII on “Joyce the Symptom,”1 both 
1 [!is title is the name given by J-A Miller to the "nal session of Jacques Lacan’s 
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regarding psychoanalytic theory and Lacan’s reading of Joyce. But there are two 
main unresolved problems within the current debate on Seminar XXIII—whether 
Lacan regarded Joyce as a psychotic (stabilised or otherwise) and the degree to 
which Lacan’s "nal seminar represents a belated rapprochement with Derrida on the 
question of “generalised writing” (Rabaté 2001, 154-182). !is paper provides a 
summary overview of the major discussions of Lacan’s intervention and then probes 
some of the "ndings, especially regarding the Joycean text. 
 I position Lacan’s inquiry in the context of his research programme into 
the unconscious, centred on the object (a) as the epistemological object of psy-
choanalysis, and then bring out the opposed character of the psychoanalytic and 
deconstructive readings of Joyce. While highlighting the insights that Lacan’s 
reading of Joyce enables, I question Lacan’s basic strategy, namely, to interpret 
not the unconscious in the text but the activity of writing as a symptom. !is 
commits Lacan to a biographical approach that he is elsewhere sceptical towards, 
with the consequence that he is forced to regard the Joycean text itself as situated 
in the dimension of unreadability; Lacan speaks of Joyce’s “scribbledehobble” in 
terms of “radically private jokes” that he elsewhere describes as located in the Real 
“which forecloses meaning” (Lacan 2005, session of 20.6.1975). A perhaps over-
looked result of this is that not only does Joyce become Lacan’s symptom, but also 
that the Lacanian seminar becomes dominated by a literary trope—that of inver-
sion and reversal in the mirror of the dopplegänger. Lacan locates Joyce as both a 
saint of letters and a literary Sphinx, declaring Joyce un-analysable on the basis 
that he enjoys without su#ering, because Joyce believes in his !ing, the sinthome 
of his work. Lacan thinks that the Joycean riddle can be solved with a fourth loop 
in the notorious Borromean knot. But, of course, with truly Sophoclean irony, 
it is Lacan who is the riddle. As Lacan’s theoretical prose becomes increasingly 
Joycean, the Joycean relation to the literary father is transposed onto Lacan’s rela-
tion to Freudian psychoanalysis. 
!e Joycean Sinthome
Certainly, the Joyce seminar is remarkable for its intellectual energy. Although 
the seminar is interrupted by Lacan’s trip to America, it is clear that Lacan 
re-read the central Joycean works during the year—Portrait of the Artist, 
Ulysses and Finnegan’s Wake—in their entirety. If this were not already enough, 
Lacan also made his way through the scholarly volumes populating the walls 
of Aubert’s extensive library, with caches of books being delivered weekly and 
regular midnight visits to Aubert to question him on recondite points of Joyce 
interpretation. At one point, Lacan declares to his audience that “you must be 
thinking that when it comes to Joyce, I’m a "sh out of water”. And he explains: 
Seminar, Book XXIII, which is called Le Sinthome. Editor.]
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“he writes with such peculiar subtlety in English that it becomes disarticulated” 
(Lacan 2005, session of 20.6.1975). !at Lacan was defeated by Joyce’s language 
seems unlikely for Lacan, of all people—this is the same Lacan who a few weeks 
before this mock-admission declares to his American audience that he has been 
practising his English by reading Joyce in the original (Smith 2000, 25–40). 
Lacan dives into the wonderland of Joyce’s works, principally concerned with its 
implications for psychoanalytic research and clinical practice. If Lacan is "nally 
defeated by what we might call Joycean llanguage,2 this is not a consequence of 
English but of the peculiar structure of these riddling texts. 
In the process, Lacan begins to produce an enigmatic series of new concepts 
within a completely fresh “turn” in his thinking. If Lacan’s trajectory can be char-
acterised by the progression through the Imaginary (from the “Rome Discourse” to 
Seminar II), the Symbolic (the “structuralist” Lacan of seminars III to XI) and the 
Real (the “post-structuralist” Lacan of seminars XII to XX) (Zizek 1989, 132-33), 
then Seminar XXIII seems to cement a fourth and "nal Lacan—the Lacan of “nom-
ination” and the x, the fourth loop in the Borromean knot; of the sinthome and 
MAN; of the Joycean ego as alternative to psychosis; and, of the radically individual 
character of the unconscious and the replacement of Lacanian “linguistrickery” by 
a new “faunetics”. Now, the loops of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary cannot be 
knotted together without the intervention of the sinthome, which, more than just 
an archaic spelling of the symptom, is the centre of gravity of the human being, the 
kernel of enjoyment sustaining the individual. For Lacan, the sinthome is “the most 
proper element of the human dimension” (Lacan quoted in Rabaté 2001, 165) and 
the referent or result of the process of nomination. !e implication of the x (or 
symptôm) is that this process connects the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real through 
the nomination (in the sense of election) of a functional equivalent for the Name-
of-the-Father. Nomination involves, then, both the election by the human being of 
their singular insertion into language, and the process whereby the subject “makes 
a name for themselves,” up to and including Joyce’s evasion of psychosis, despite 
the absence of the paternal function, through his nomination of his own ego as the 
functional equivalent of the Name-of-the-Father. In the "rst instance, “Joyce the 
symptom” signi"es that the proper name nominated by James, and made through 
the literary works of Joyce, is coextensive with the sinthome of a radically private use 
of language: Joyce (the literary name) is the symptom of Joyce (the man); the works 
of Joyce are the replacement for a radically de"cient paternal signi"er that keeps the 
man Joyce sane. Who can doubt Lacan’s intellectual courage? Can there be any real 
uncertainty that this is a fundamental revision of the conceptual armature of the 
previous decade? Surely, this is a last rupture with everything that had been estab-
lished in so-called “Lacanianism”—almost, one might say, a handful of suggestive 
brushstrokes on a fresh canvas. 
2 [A term referred to as “lalangue” in Lacanian terms and context. Editor.]
Geo"rey Boucher
102  |  Analysis 16, 2011
Along the way there are also the opaque topological ruminations, Duchampian 
wordplays and intellectual meanderings that characterise the "nal period. Lacan 
regrets that he has nothing to say and wonders whether Joyce was mad. He wonders 
with strategic naivety why Joyce bothered to publish his scribbledehobble. Gone 
are the dazzling insights into the texts of Shakespeare and Claudel, Sophocles and 
Gide. Instead of textual commentary that suddenly blazes into the heart of a new 
understanding of the literary work, we have pages and pages of multicoloured 
diagrams, word salads and neo-Dadaesque provocations to the audience, numero-
logical speculations and diagrammatic conjectures. It is not just that Lacan simply 
cannot absorb the entire library of Joyce scholarship in a hectic year of teaching. 
In the place where a new reading might be, there is a biographical interpretation 
of the Joycean work that becomes more insistent as Lacan’s perplexity at the texts 
increases. At the same time, Lacan’s own text becomes ever more openly Joycean: 
acrostic rather than aphoristic; inscrutable rather than enigmatic; hermetic rather 
than hermeneutic. “Joyce the symptom”—whose symptom is this Joyce that seems 
forced on Lacan? If Lacan baptises Joyce with his proper name—as Lacan claims to 
do—then who prepares the way for whom? Joyce might indeed have had, as Lacan 
suspects, a redeemer delusion. But the redeemer’s mission is primed by compara-
tives—“one will always be inferior to the task”—if not superlatives. !is is Lacan’s 
position of enunciation throughout the seminar: “I have need to be baptized of 
thee, and comest thou to me?” (Matthew 3:14). 
It is not that Lacan in his "nal seminar lacked intellectual power, but that his 
theoretical position lacked penetration—at least, into Joyce’s texts. I do not accept 
the condescending theory of the advancing senility of the "nal years. !e reduction 
of language to its letters, the condensation of complex discursive motifs into a series 
of deceptively simple sigla—these I would describe as perfectly Joycean, rather than 
intellectually enfeebled. I completely discount the theories of the “Lacanian delu-
sion” and the master’s sterility returning with a vengeance at the end of his life. 
!ese notions of a de"ciency in Lacan’s intellectual energies are contradicted by the 
text of the seminar at every point. Instead of speculations on the impotence of the 
master, to account for the cryptic nature of “Joyce the Symptom,” the reading of 
Rabaté of Joyce as Lacan’s symptom has immense potential. I understand Rabaté’s 
position to have highlighted the relative di#erence in their respective powers of 
insight—where Lacan’s interpretation of Joyce remains within the ambit of bio-
graphical criticism and traditional scholarship, the encounter with Joyce provokes 
one last revision of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
As Rabaté observes, throughout the seminar, Lacan’s concern is not to position 
Joyce’s work within the discourse of the university, as the object of a scholarly 
knowledge that barely conceals its will to mastery even as it puts the intimidated 
clerks to work (Rabaté 2001, 160). Instead, Lacan is operating within analytical 
discourse, where the analyst positions themself as the “trash” (the trashitas rather 
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than the pious caritas), the remainder of enjoyment left over from the signifying 
operations of the subject (1981). Lacan identi"es the object (a), the sinthome, 
with the saintly man (saint-homme) who has renounced mastery, and then with 
St !omas Aquinas (sinthomaquinas) who is just as crazy as Joyce (and Lacan) 
(“Joyce displaces the saint homme from my madaquinisme”) (Lacan 2005, session 
of 18.11.1975). Employing just such a mythical knowledge, the analyst, as agent 
within analytical discourse, is positioned in dialogue with the divided subject 
of the unconscious, and by insisting on the place of the symptom—the object 
(a)—the analyst allows the subject to produce those master signi"ers that are, 
rather than its symptom, the cause of its su#ering. Yet the twist is that in Seminar 
XXIII, it is Joyce who occupies the place of the sinthomaquinas, whose language is 
the madaquinisme of acrostic re-combinations, trans-linguistic homophonies and 
untranslatable puns. Joyce is Lacan’s literary saint, whose letters reduce the English 
language to litter even as they generate a “Joyce” who is entirely distributed across 
the ruins of the signi"er. In the “faunetics” of Lacan’s Wake, the text is traversed 
by a major movement whose tropology is highly literary: ironic reversal and 
the chiasmatic exchange of properties. As Lacan becomes ever more Joycean—
moving, indeed, towards what some have called a “post-Joycean conception of the 
end of analysis” (Harari 2002, 359)—Joyce increasingly occupies the position of 
Lacan’s divine trashitas. 
A focus on language and the operations of literary irony in the seminar 
implies acceptance of the position of, for instance, Philippe Julien, that the 
Borromean knots are a distraction, a lure for the desire to directly comprehend 
the transmitted message in the form of a spatialised schema. Indeed, I consider 
the entire departure of the Borromean topology—Lacan admits to being “the 
prey of the knot”—to exhibit an imaginary captivation. Along these lines, Julien 
proposes that these diagrams, initially introduced as mnemonic devices to support 
a uniform paedagogy, usurp their cognitively subordinate status and posture as 
non-symbolisable mathematical objects (Julien 1994). Yet they are everywhere 
used by Lacan as visual representations for linguistically conveyed concepts. 
Accordingly, their topological value is nil, because they are not generated by 
formal mathematical reasoning but through the symbolic postulation of analo-
gies, although as images of theoretical positions their utility is unquestionable. 
Lacan’s fundamental insight is that the unconscious is structured like a language, 
not like a mathematical surface. !at Lacan decided to express this deep theoreti-
cal insight through the quasi-mathematical diagrams is potentially unfortunate. 
Instead of Lacan’s mathematical re&ections, we can interpret the ruination of the 
signi"er and the endlessly suggestive enjoy-meant of the recombination of letters 
into portmanteau words and polyvocal, multi-lingual jokes, that characterises 
Finnegans Wake as a "nal model for the operations of the unconscious. 
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Lacan’s encounter with Joyce
In his lecture to Aubert’s symposium, Lacan stresses that the encounter between 
Joyce and Lacan happened in reality—in 1921 they actually met in a Paris book-
store—as well as in a certain relation to language, one that ruptures the everyday 
pragmatics of what Lacan calls “the chatterbox,” and which instead facilitates the 
emergence of equivocation and polyvocality. We can specify that this encounter 
with Joyce involves both subjective identi"cation and theoretical revision. 
In Seminar XXIII (although not for the "rst time), Lacan stages a profound 
identi"cation with Joyce. According to Néstor Braunstein, Joyce is Lacan’s literary 
alter ego (Braunstein quoted in Rabaté 2001, 174). Yet perhaps this formulation 
is not quite accurate. Lacan maintains that Joyce is indi#erent to his reception 
yet highly narcissistic. Despite his lack of human sympathy for Joyce, in the 
Joyce Seminar, Lacan highlights a cluster of shared symbolic traits—their mutual 
rejection of Catholicism, their style in language, their reduction of labyrinthine 
signifying complexity to a series of elementary diagrams. In other words, Joyce 
functions here for Lacan not as imaginary other but as bearer of a symbolic iden-
ti"cation. Joyce, Lacan declares, “is like me: a heretic”. But the Lacanian “heresy” 
(heresie—Lacan’s pun on RSI, the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary) is to be sup-
plemented by the Joycean apostasy. 
Lacan’s identi"cation with Joyce determines the transposition of this rela-
tion into the text, with frequent elision of the distinction between Joyce and his 
characters. “Stephen,” Lacan announces, “is in other words, Joyce as he imagines 
himself ” (2005, session of 13.01.1976). And again: “Stephen is Joyce as he solves 
his own riddle,” through the search for an absent/lacking father in the progress 
of Ulysses. “Ulysses bears witness to the way in which Joyce remains rooted in his 
father, even as he denies him—and this is exactly his symptom” (Lacan 2005, session 
of 13.01.1976). Yet strangely, Lacan at the same time announces his intention to 
interpret the symptom of the work rather than the unconscious within the text.
!ere is no doubt that Lacan read copiously Joyce and Joyce criticism. Lacan’s 
research question, however, is not “what is the meaning of these texts?” but “what 
was the function of his art for Joyce?” If the fertility of a Lacanian approach has 
been abundantly demonstrated by the critical works of Jean-Michel Rabaté (as the 
foremost among several Lacanian Joyce critics), then, Lacan’s own strategy is based 
on a frankly biographical approach. 
Guided by an attentive reading of Richard Ellmann’s important work, Aubert’s 
patient scholarship and close analysis of Joyce’s letters, Lacan’s thesis is that Joyce’s art 
supplements the de"cient Name-of-the-Father. Lacan appears to have interpreted 
both Portrait and Ulysses as autobiographical. For Lacan, then, the crucial datum 
is the failure of the paternal function on the part of John Joyce, so that the writing 
of James Joyce becomes a supplement to this fundamental de"ciency. Joyce, as the 
thesis goes, “makes a Name [of the Father] for himself ” through his endless writing, 
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thus fathering himself as the son. !e Lacanian discourse on Joycean “original sin” 
interprets this motif in terms of the failure of the RSI to knot together around the 
Name-of-the-Father, so that writing acts as a prosthetic paternity, a rejoining of the 
sundered links. Joyce’s artistic career is interpreted externally as the symptom of a 
compensation for the paternal de"ciency, based in a wish for a real father.
In the "eld of Joyce studies, at least, Lacan’s theoretical compass is determined 
by his respect for traditional literary scholarship, especially that of Robert Adams 
and Clive Hart. Lacan also makes use of Jacques Aubert’s edition of Ulysses. Adams 
Surface and Symbol: !e Consistency of Ulysses proposes that most of the texture 
that provides narrative verisimilitude in the novel is super"cial detail (some of it 
factually wrong) rather than “luminous symbol”. Accordingly, the “meaningless is 
interwoven with the meaningful” and the novel “does not make a neat allegory” 
(Adams 1967, 25–26). Lacan’s interpretation of this is that Adams has identi"ed 
the distinction between the imaginary consistency of the diegetic world formu-
lated in the symbolic medium of the narration, and the Joycean epiphanies that 
appear at right angles to the symbolic texture as interruptions where meaning and 
meaninglessness interpenetrate. But like Adams, Lacan does not fully take up the 
implications of Stephen’s (highly Lacanian) equation of Shakespeare with the Ghost 
in Hamlet. One result is that the Oedipal dynamics of the struggle over literary pro-
genitors for Joyce (the name, not the man) are missed by Lacan, and consequently, 
Ulysses begins to seem like a text transitional towards psychosis. 
Hart’s Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake uses the motif of the crossed 
circle to describe the cosmological structure of Finnegans Wake. !e quartered circle 
symbolises the Viconian division of history into four ages (if you include the ricorso 
as an age, which Joyce does), while the cyclical structure adumbrates the narrative 
circle of the Wake itself. All of this thematises the circularity of a text that returns 
on itself in the "rst and last lines, yet constantly generates new interpretations with 
every traversal of the textual surface. Finally, the motif of the crossed circle indi-
cates the problem of squaring the circle, that is, a mathematical problem involving 
in"nite recursion, which adequately summarises the generative matrix of this most 
important Joycean work (Hart 1962). But for Lacan, the elaborate manipulation 
of rings of string and quasi-geometrical "gures is not intended to summon up the 
“bad in"nity” of deconstructive dissemination. Instead, the act of abstraction from 
the textual surface to its generative problematic discloses the mechanism by which 
the whole work forms a “consistency without unity”—that is, a style of the subject. 
Lacan is wary of what we might call “psychoanalysis and other ruses”—depth 
hermeneutics, father-son patterns and the collective unconscious. He excoriates 
Mark Shechner’s Joyce in Nighttown, on the basis that it trivialises the actual text, 
reducing it to a schema external to the signi"cations of the nighttown sequence 
(Schechner 1974). Shechner is taken as illustrative of “applied psychoanalysis,” 
which involves not an encounter with the text with the potential to transform theory, 
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but the application of an interpretive grid to the text so as to validate a hermeneutic 
result actually determined outside the work itself. Lacan is also highly suspicious 
of the psychoanalytic motifs nested within the text. He rejects the conception of 
Bloom as father to Dedalus. Lacan dismisses Joyce’s dalliance with occultism and 
obscurantism (Blavatsky). His comment on the relation between Finnegan’s Wake 
and the collective unconscious is profound and damning: the idiosyncrasy of the 
text is a precise refutation of the speculations of Jungian psychoanalysis, which 
stands unveiled as itself a symptomatic defense against the unconscious. Finally, and 
perhaps too de"nitively, Lacan rejects the mythological structuration of Ulysses and 
the Wake (Homer and Vico).
Lacan’s intuition is that Joyce is a literary saint—on the one hand, meaningless 
trash, an objectival remainder of the signi"cation process; on the other hand, a "gure 
who “is” only as text, that is, who dissolves into the Joycean writing. According to 
Lacan, “in his art, Joyce, in a privileged manner, aimed at the fourth term of the 
knot” (2005, session of 09.12.1975). At one level, what this means is fairly clear: 
“Joyce compensated for the lacking father” (Lacan 2005, session of 17.02.1976). 
As Lacan says, “what I proposed very gently last time was that Joyce has a symptom 
whose origin is this: that his father was lacking, radically lacking—he speaks of 
nothing but this” (2005, session of 17.02.1976). Again: “it turns out in Ulysses that 
Joyce has to support the father’s subsistence” (Lacan 2005, session of 18.11.1975). 
Yet before we conclude with Catherine Millot that the opposition between 
analysts and critics entails a division in the reception of Joyce between the mean-
inglessness and the meaningfulness of the texts, we need to consider Lacan’s 
interpretation of the enigma of Joyce’s work (Millot 1988, 207–09). Again, Lacan 
does not fully observe his own stricture regarding the distinction between an exter-
nal approach (the enigma of Joyce’s work; art as symptom) an internal hermeneutic 
(the enigmas in Joyce’s work; the textual unconscious). !e acrostics of the Joycean 
text fascinate Lacan as a new riddle of the Sphinx—that is, Joyce is an anti-Oedipus 
for Lacanian psychoanalysis. Aubert’s reading of the Stephen-Bloom relation as a 
puzzle whose solution is “the Name-of-the-Father” is indicative of the fascination, 
as is Lacan’s own interpretation of the moment in Portrait where Stephen is beaten 
by his friends in terms of the bodily ego as a detachable envelope. 
Lacan is interested, for instance, in the riddle that Stephen Dedalus tells 
his class:
!e cock crew, !e sky was blue: !e bells in heaven, Were striking eleven. 
‘Tis time for this poor soul, To go to heaven. (Joyce 1968, 22)
!e “solution” to the riddle is “the fox burying his grandmother under a hol-
lybush”. But as Roberto Harari notes, this riddle is preceded by another that has a 
clearer bearing on psychoanalysis (2002, 134-36):
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Riddle me, riddle me, randy row. 
My father gave me seeds to sow.
!e rest of the riddle (not supplied) is “the seed was black and the ground was 
white/Riddle me that and I’ll give you a pipe”. !e solution to this riddle is writing 
a letter. !e paternal seed only germinates in the form of letters. According to 
Lacan, the distinction between Joyce and Oedipus is that because Joyce believes in 
his sinthome, he does not desire to solve the riddle of himself (Harari 2002, 135). 
But it is not clear that Lacan can entirely resist the temptation. 
Lacan’s confrontation with deconstruction
Perhaps for this reason, at the moment of the turn in avant-garde theory, during 
the mid-1970s, to textual formalism and “revolutions of the word,” Lacan is not 
interested in the liberation of the signi"er. Unimpressed by the ruptures with the 
dominant ideology said to spring from the dissolution of the subject into the textual 
network, Lacan’s objective is exactly the opposite of the literary experimentalism 
of Philippe Sollers and the critical vanguardism of Roland Barthes. Lacan’s ques-
tion goes something like this. Given the generation of the identity of the speaking 
subject in the anonymity of the signifying chain, through a contingent series of 
identi"cations, how can we account for the evident style of the subject, its idiosyn-
cratic adoption of language, expressive of a unique subjectivity?
Such a question means that Lacan is ineluctably involved in a theoretical con-
frontation with Derrida. Indeed, the various “revolutions of the word” supposedly 
heralded by the Joycean text, although often enlisting Lacan as a theoretical author-
ity, in actuality employ deconstructive rather than psychoanalytic insights.
One dimension of this confrontation dates from Seminar XX and the reading 
of Lacan by deconstructionists Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy 
(1992). !e basic accusation made in that text is that Lacan reinstates the unitary 
subject of the Cartesian cogito by means of the ruse of placing it “under the bar” 
of signi"cation, that is, in the unconscious. !e elementary Lacanian rejoinder to 
this frank misreading is that the subject of the unconscious is eccentric to itself—
its substance is external to its existence as a product of the chain of signi"cation, 
lying as it does in the object (a). Hence the Lacanian subject cannot be concep-
tualised as a Cartesian unity of thinking and being—however disguised, buried 
or repressed—because it is by de"nition divided between these alternatives. !is 
is the entire meaning of Lacan’s tortuous excursions into the topic of the forced 
choice and his restatement of the Cartesian cogito as a disjunctive syllogism, from 
Seminar XI onwards. According to Lacan, the cogito does not run “I am think-
ing, therefore I am,” but “where I am thinking, there I am not, and where I am, 
there I am not thinking” (Lacan 1998a, 224–25). !is rejoinder is not explicitly 
provided in Seminar XX—Lacan has other things on his mind and only says that 
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although Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy read “with the worst of intentions,” they are 
e#ectively addressing a love letter to him by supposing his full knowledge of the 
unconscious (Lacan 1998b, 64–69). Yet it is easy to see how Seminar XXIII com-
pletes a Lacanian rejoinder: Joyce, the subject, as Joyce-the-symptom, has all of his 
being, his substance, outside him, in the sinthome of the Joycean work. 
!e apparent rapprochement with Derrida in Seminar XXIII—Lacan declares 
that some of their insights are in accord, on the basis of Lacan’s prior demonstration 
of the existence of the bar of signi"cation—therefore conceals a deep underlying 
di#erence. Derrida reads Joyce as an instance of the dissemination generated by 
the “infrastructures,” deep textual quasi-structures supporting and subverting the 
signi"er with their limitless and anarchic play (Derrida 1988, 27–75). Accordingly, 
Derrida positions Joyce in the lineage of textual experimentation running through 
Artaud, Mallarmé and Celan. Indeed, from his opening work on Husserl onwards, 
Derrida steadfastly maintained that Joyce’s project was the opposite of the Husserlian 
reduction of multiplicity to univocal self-presence—the Joycean work is taken to 
represent a dispersion of the self-present intentionality of the ego into the textual 
network that supports and subverts consciousness (Derrida 1978, 102). In group-
ing Derrida’s interpretive strategy with his own insights, then, Lacan is probably 
being a bit too generous—just as he had previously recommended to his audience 
that they all read Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, despite the hostility of these authors. 
For in actuality, Lacan is highly sceptical of the deconstructive e#ort to demonstrate 
that the dissemination of the textual infrastructures explains the Joycean text, that 
is, to claim Joyce as the broadcast mechanism for a grammatological demonstration. 
While the Derridean record tends to grind out the same threnody irrespective of the 
literary author in question, it is manifestly evident for Lacan that Joyce is exactly 
the opposite of what he should be for deconstruction—Lacan’s Joyce is a signature.
!at the Joycean liberation of the signi"er brings the unconscious into play is 
not for a moment questioned by Lacan. But Lacan’s interest lies elsewhere, in the 
proper name of the author, that is, in the emergence of a distinctive style of the 
subject despite the “subversion of the subject in the dialectic of desire”. !e limita-
tions of the deconstructive position, by contrast with Lacanian psychoanalysis, have 
been explored in detail by Peter Dews in Logics of Disintegration (1987). According 
to Dews, the problem faced by Derrida is that the endless dissemination of the 
textual infrastructures prevents the emergence of meaning and therefore blocks the 
identity of the subject. By contrast, Lacan can explain the emergence of meaning 
without reverting to the "ction of the self-present intentionality of the speaking 
subject, because Lacan proposes that the object (a) is a non-specular double for the 
subject. In the “lost” object, the divided subject can unconsciously recognise them-
selves without that involving a transparent, Cartesian ego (Dews 1987, 107-33). 
Lacan’s theorisation of the object (a) happens in relation to the concepts 
of alienation and separation. Conceptually, the entry of the speakingbeing into 
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language requires the transformation of the linearity of instincts into the circularity 
of the drives, through the cutting out of any determined object of the instincts and 
its replacement by a signi"er that acts as the ideational representative of the drives. 
But this logically requires two steps (even though these factually happen at the 
same time): the creation of a “hole in the Real” and the emplacement of a signi"er 
in that hole. We can relate these two steps to alienation and separation, as well as 
to Lacan’s earlier schema of the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, developed in 
the text “On the Possible Treatment of Psychosis”. In that initial explanation, Lacan 
proposed that “the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father … is the metaphor that 
substitutes this Name in the place "rst symbolised by the operation of the absence 
of the mother” (Lacan 1977, 200). 
!is process can be schematised as follows:
Name-of-the-Father
Desire of the Mother
. .
Name-of-the-Father O
Phallus
Desire of the Mother
Signi"ed to the Subject
But Lacan continues: 
Let us now try to conceive of a circumstance of the subjective position in 
which, to the appeal of the Name-of-the-Father responds, not the absence of 
the real father … but the inadequacy of the signi"er itself. …!e presence of 
the signi"er in the Other is, in e#ect, a presence usually closed to the subject, 
because it usually persists in a state of repression … [But, for the psychotic,] 
to the point at which the Name-of-the-Father is called … may correspond 
in the Other, then, a mere hole, which, by the inadequacy of the metaphoric 
e#ect, will provoke a corresponding hole at the place of phallic signi"cation 
(Lacan 1977, 200–01).
!e paternal “No!” has not repressed the mother as enjoyment, and so the Name-
of-the-Father cannot operate as a phallic signi"cation. Instead, it is foreclosed. 
!e consequences of this are familiar from Seminar III: the imaginary status of 
the phallic signi"er, the degeneration of language into rei"ed objects and sentence 
fragments of a Grundsprache (“basic language,” or “mother tongue”) profoundly 
permeated with enjoyment, the invasion of the Real in the form of hallucinations 
and a paranoiac relation to the Other. 
But in his subsequent considerations of the dialectic of desire, in Seminar 
VI, Lacan appears to develop this notion of a paternal “No!” in the form of the 
“unary trait,” the mark of lack in the Other, symbolised as S(Ø). !e initial mark 
that occupies the place of the hole in the Real created by the absence of the mother 
as enjoyment cannot be a signi"er, because it is itself the condition for entry into 
language. !at implies that the S(Ø) is neither articulable nor di#erential: it is 
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non-fungible and silent, yet it marks the place of the infant’s entry into language. 
We can conjecture that the object (a), the object of the drive that is also the object 
of desire, is the phantasmaic “referent” of this impossible, primordial “ur-signi"er,” 
S(Ø). Like the S(Ø), the object (a) is non-symbolisable yet always returns to the 
same place. Unlike the S(Ø), the object (a) has an imaginary component, appearing 
as it does foremost in the other. 
!e non-fungible mark that creates a hole in the Real and makes it possible for 
the infant to enter the Symbolic Order occupies the position of the object (a)—the 
ideational representative of the drives—only to be displaced by the object signi"ed 
by the paternal signi"er. !is mark is not a signi"er properly speaking—because it is 
non-displaceable and non-di#erential. But it is also not a part of the Real (it makes 
a hole in the Real). Nor is it Imaginary, although it has an imaginary aspect insofar 
as it appears through the other. Otherwise expressed: the unique entry point of the 
human being into the "eld of the signi"er happens—right from the start of Lacan’s 
thinking—through the intervention of something that is not, properly speaking, 
Imaginary, Symbolic or Real. 
In other words, alongside the cataclysmic revision of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
something else is also going on, namely, a return to the concepts elaborated in 
Seminar III. Here, Lacan sees Joyce as a proof a contrario of the hypothesis that the 
Name-of-the-Father is the key to entry into the Symbolic Order. 
Lacan’s insights into the Joycean text
For Lacan, the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is the basic key to the Joycean 
text—with the di#erence, compared to the "gure of Schreber investigated in 
Seminar III, that Joyce engages in “nomination,” that is, construction of a replace-
ment for the paternal function. !e liberation of the signi"er in Joyce’s work is 
accomplished through an aberrant relation to the paternal function, so that art is 
the process by which Joyce “makes his name”. !e theme of original sin in Joyce is 
therefore interpreted as a sign of paternal failure and in particular paternal perver-
sion. Paternal perversion describes the father-son relation in terms of a turn to the 
father, as a defense against the mother, that generates "lial masochism. In particular, 
the de"ciency of the real father—John Joyce—leads James Joyce to seek replacement 
paternal "gures with su$cient gravity to supplement the lack in the Name-of-
the-Father. !is leads Lacan to interpret Bloom and Stephen as sons rather than 
a father-son "gure, with the consequence that the literary fathers (Homer, Dante, 
and especially, Shakespeare) are the problem posed by the Joycean text. 
Yet, paradoxically, Lacan does not fully follow up this insight into Portrait, 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, perhaps because of his determination to interpret 
art as symptom rather than the unconscious in art. Instead, the accent in Lacan’s 
reading falls on the fabrication of a paternal signi"er through the arti"ce of 
“making a name”. 
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Lacan provides a brilliant reading of the transition from Portrait to Ulysses 
that demonstrates, that the Name-of-the-Father and the lack of a sexual rela-
tion are correlates, just as the lack of the Name-of-the-Father can be correlated 
with the existence of a sexual relation. For Joyce forges a Name-of-the-Father for 
himself; consequently, there is a sexual relation between James Joyce and Nora 
Joyce (nee Barnacle). 
Harari summarises this economically in the chapter “Eve in the Labyrinth of 
Daedalus” of his How James Joyce Made His Name. !e chapter sets itself the task 
of interpretation of the “beginnings of Joyce’s literary project” in Stephen Hero 
and Portrait. In Portrait, the accent falls on the “arti"cer” whose artisanal pro-
duction is aestheticised through Joyce’s “!omist” aesthetics. Stephen Dedalus is 
linked through naming to arti"ce in a lineage that connects him to Daedalus (an 
inventor) and then Hephaestus (the arti"cer). Daedalus constructs the labyrinth 
of Minos and then becomes imprisoned in his own creation. Escaping with his 
son Icarus by means of arti"cial wings, the son &ies too close to the sun, falls 
and dies. !e son and the father are mutually exclusive categories, for Joyce. His 
nomadic existence, meanwhile, testi"es to his failure to "nd a protective father 
who would shelter his endeavours. 
Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a 
mystic state, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. 
On that mystery and not on the Madonna which the cunning Italian 
intellect &ung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and founded 
irremovably because founded, like the world, macro and microcosm, upon 
the void. (Joyce 1968, 170)
Joyce concludes that “Amor Matris, subjective and objective genitive, may be 
the only true thing in life”. !e notion that the love of the mother enjoys the 
ambivalence of the genitive (love of and love for) is reminiscent of the desire of the 
Other, as is Joyce’s conclusion that “paternity may be a legal "ction”. But in the 
section on Shakespeare, Stephen elaborates that Shakespeare, in writing the charac-
ter Hamlet, “was not the father of his own son merely, but, being no more a son, he 
was and felt himself the father of all of his race, the father of his own grandfather, 
the father of his unborn grandson” (Joyce 1968, 171). What is at stake here is the 
fabrication of an Other of the Other, expressed in terms of a fantasy of auto-genesis. 
!e father begins when and where the son ends. Correlatively, to become a father 
the son must destroy his own father, and father himself, as the only possible way to 
be son and father at once. 
For Lacan, the Name-of-the-Father is located in the place of lack. But Joyce 
does not really lack. Evidence for this comes form his relationship to Nora: Nora 
"ts him, says Lacan, like a glove. !at is to say, with Nora there exists a sexual 
relationship. For Joyce, Lacan stresses, Nora is !e Woman. She “"tted” him like 
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a glove—that is, there is nothing contingent about their encounter (Harari 2002, 
164-70). In the letters, a set of exacting sexual practices highlight this "tting like 
a glove—Joyce wants to savour the “very stink and sweat that rises from [Nora’s] 
arse”—and when children intrude into the relationship, there is trouble, because 
there is no space in the glove for three (Harari 2002, 165-68). 
So, secondly, the existence of a sexual relation means that there is a necessary 
rather than contingent connection between Real and Symbolic, drive and desire. 
Lacan diagnoses the existence of a sexual relation in Nora/Molly and uses this as the 
key to understanding Joyce’s women, including Eve/Issy. !e presence of a sexual 
relation in the absence of a paternal function means that a scission opens between 
Joycean enjoyment and the enjoyment of Woman (God). 
Joyce’s challenge to Lacan
!e problem for the Lacanian reading of Portrait, Ulysses and the Wake is that accord-
ing to the considerations outlined so far, Joyce should be psychotic. Yet as Rabaté 
stresses, Joyce scholars are reluctant to consider these works to be the productions 
of a psychosis (Rabaté 2006, 26–42). Indeed, Lacan himself has serious reservations 
as to whether the texts are authentic productions of a psychotic state—he considers 
most of it to engage in a sort of mimicry of schizophrenic discourse. 
Before examining the implications of this, I want to simply gather the evi-
dence that this is indeed, and despite strong reservations, the overall direction of 
Lacan’s thinking. Lacan regards Joyce as the author of a progression of documents—
Stephen Hero, Portrait, Ulysses, Wake—that testify to a struggle against psychosis. “In 
fact,” Lacan maintains:
in the continuing progress of his art—namely that speech which comes to 
be written, to be broken, to be dislocated, so that in the end to read him 
seems an encounter with a continuing progress, from his "rst e#orts in the 
critical essays, then in Portrait of the Artist and again in Ulysses, concluding 
with Finnegans Wake—it is hard not to see that a certain relation to language 
is increasingly imposed on him, to the point where he ends up breaking 
or dissolving language itself, by decomposing it, going beyond phonatory 
identity (Lacan 2005, session of 17.02.1976).
I have already mentioned the de"ciency of the paternal name and the existence 
of a sexual relation. Lacan also mentions three other decisive symptoms of psy-
chotic process in Joyce: hallucinations (imposed voices and a redeemer delusion), 
the disintegration of language into letters and the irruption of the real in the form 
of epiphanies. Finally, implied in Lacan’s discourse and supported by Joyce’s biogra-
phy, there are strong aetiological indications of a schizogenic situation in the family 
background, which, taken together with Lucia’s own schizophrenic break, appear to 
ground Lacan’s position in a clinically solid diagnostic insight. 
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Hallucinations. Lacan seems convinced that Joyce su#ered from a redeemer 
delusion—not to redeem God, but to redeem the father at God’s behest. Indeed, 
the “barmy idea” of redemption happens insofar as “there is a relation of the son 
to the father”. Lacan proposes that this results in Joyce’s language (or Llanguage, 
lalangue, pre-Symbolic babble) that he calls jouis-sens (enjoy-meant) and links this 
to “imposed speech”—the voice of !em in paranoid hallucination as well as the 
inspired wordplays of Joycean arti"ce. !e Real—the register of the !ing—is 
ab-sens (absent meaning), present in Joycean Llanguage. According to Lacan, Joyce 
accepted the “calling” (by God) to break up the English language and eliminate 
mindless routinisation from it.
Lacan also considers that Joyce transposed his own symptom of imposed voices 
onto Lucia when he maintained that she was capable of marvellous forms of 
communication. Lacan interprets this as a claim about telepathy and understands 
that Joyce thereby implicates himself in his daughter’s symptom. For Lacan, Lucia 
is an extension of Joyce’s symptom/sinthome. Joyce believed in Lucia as in his 
writing: for Joyce, she was more intelligent than others, capable of miraculously 
informing him about others’ fate; she is merely eccentric, she does not hear voices 
but is capable of telepathy. 
Language. According to Lacan, Joyce “allows himself to be invaded by the 
essentially phonematic qualities of speech, by its polyphony” (Lacan 2005, session 
of 16.07.1975). !e implication is that in Joycean portmanteau words and linguis-
tic puns, we are dealing not with metaphors but with moments where the “knot” 
of the sinthome, essential for holding the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary 
together for Joyce, momentarily fails. !e implication is that in the place of meta-
phor, Joyce maintains endless chains of metonymic equivocation. But these chains 
of metonymic equivocation are punctuated, not by metaphors, but by moments 
where the meaningless Real discloses itself. Accordingly, his text is an archipelago of 
epiphanies in a sea of metonymy, which Lacan understands to consist of moments 
of the “splendour of Being” or irruption of the Real, into the banality of corrupted 
speech or everyday experience. In this sense, the Joycean practice of annihilating 
English with a fundamentally Other language that would make way for these iso-
lated moments of radiance is not unlike Schreber’s Grundsprache from Seminar III. 
Epiphanies. Indeed, the epiphanies are interrupted moments of speech remi-
niscent of the fragmented discourse of Schreber’s rays. !e epiphany must be 
rigorously opposed to equivocation—in equivocation (especially punning) the 
meaning emerges only with a saturation of context; in epiphanies, the radiance 
emerges as a rupture with a context de"ned in advance as meaningless (banal). As 
Harari observes:
the extasis that comes over being at the moment of the epiphany does not 
generate meaning. !is would also imply—as we have observed in Joyce’s 
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work—a failure of metaphorisation… !e evacuation of phallic signi"cation 
from what surges up in the epiphany, touching on mysticism and devoid of 
all meaning, means that it can be categorised…as being in contact with the 
!ing (Harari 2002, 73, 77).
Aetiology. In aetiological terms, there is plenty of evidence to support Lacan’s con-
tention of a lifelong struggle against psychosis. !ere appears to be a crisis between 
Portrait and Ulysses insofar as Joyce’s conviction that “one great part of every human 
existence is passed in a state which cannot be rendered sensible by the use of 
wideawake language, cutanddry grammar, and goahead plot” represents a radical 
departure from the aesthetics of Portrait (Ellmann 1975, 318). Between Ulysses and 
the Wake a fresh crisis intervenes: the death of Joyce’s father and the collapse of 
Lucia into schizophrenia. It is reasonable to suppose that the radical derangement of 
the signi"er into constituent letters in the Wake bears some relation to these events. 
If Ulysses stages an abortive return to the father, then the Wake is an explora-
tion of the “original sin” of his lack. !e riddle Joyce poses throughout is that of 
writing a letter (as a result of a mandate from his father). In psychotic style, this 
writing a letter becomes a writing of letters, (de-)composed of letters and decom-
posed into letters. Hence the portmanteau words, the bilingual puns, the acrostic 
character of the Joycean text. Joycean ambition—summarised as the creation of 
the uncreated conscience of his race (genealogical not ethnic)—is immortality, 
the destiny of a unique writing, which Lacan "nally identi"es with the role of the 
Joycean ego in tying together the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary for James 
Joyce. To summarise: the Joycean sinthome is his own ego, considered in its almost 
megalomaniacal character as the bearer of a special destiny.
Now we come, though, to the crucial interpretive decision. A basic question 
facing anyone confronting Seminar XXIII is whether the sinthome appears when the 
standard Name-of-the-Father lacks (that is, when an individual might otherwise slide 
into psychosis), or instead whether every person has a sinthome. We can say that Lacan 
prefers the second option—he talks of the sinthome as the elementary human dimen-
sion and the psychotic kernel of every individual—and that the commentators have 
followed Lacan in this. From this perspective, Lacan performs on Lacan the same con-
ceptual operation of abstraction and generalisation that he had previously performed 
on Freud’s father in the Oedipus Complex. Recall that Lacan, from at least Seminar III 
onwards, maintains that it is not the empirical father who is decisive, but the signi"er 
representing the paternal function—which means that the Oedipus Complex, with 
its requirement of identi"cation with the imago of a speci"c individual, is a myth, a 
specious generalisation of a particular instance, but one that nonetheless accurately 
re&ects something important about the underlying universal process. 
!e fourth knot—the x that supplements the Real, the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary, knotting them together—is originally the Name-of-the-Father (but 
no longer conceived as an element of the Symbolic Order). Reconceptualising the 
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Name-of-the-Father outside the Symbolic Order as the sinthome, the fourth loop of 
the quadruple Borromean knot, implies a new generalisation, of which the Name-
of-the-Father is but one speci"cation (others include Woman, God and Joyce). 
Hence Lacan asks himself, “was it not in compensation for this paternal abdication, 
this Verwerfung [foreclosure] in fact, that Joyce felt himself imperiously called—this 
is the very word, resulting from a mass of things in his text—to valorise his proper 
name at his father’s expense?” (2005, session of 10.02.1976). !e Name-of-the-
Father is lacking; Joyce writes to compensate for this, to make himself a proper 
name as well as to make a name for himself; and, “Joyce’s art is so particular that 
the term sinthome is very "tting for it” (Lacan 2005, 10.02.1976). Sinthome, the 
concept, is a high-level generalisation, a functional element that knots together the 
Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Sinthome, the particular thing that every 
individual clings to, will be something absolutely singular, that functions as or in 
the place of the Name-of-the-Father. Does not the concept of “nomination” (the 
nomination of a sinthome) perform the same operation of abstraction and generali-
sation on the paternal function?
Elegant as this might seem, we should sound a note of caution. Lacan says explic-
itly that the sinthome in Joyce emerges through nomination, a peculiar operation 
that happens because of the failure of the Name-of-the-Father. Lacan is then being 
completely consistent when he characterises Joyce’s condition as a de facto foreclo-
sure—that is, not one de jure, according to the Law. Joyce mimics the Law in his 
practice of nomination, thus operating so deep within the standard coordinates of 
the Oedipus Complex that it is quite possible to read Finnegans Wake in terms of 
an Oedipal address to the father and as an Oedipal staging in relation to the literary 
father, Shakespeare (Cheng 1984). At the same time, Joyce is “disinvested from the 
unconscious,” according to Lacan. He is not, in other words, a divided subject. For 
Lacan, because Joyce believed in his sinthome, he is not analysable—he does not 
su#er from his symptom; his symptom indeed cures him (or keeps him sane).
All of this suggests that rather than looking for a fourth and "nal Lacan, we 
should warily regard Joyce as a proof a contrario of Lacan’s earlier theses on psychosis 
and the phallus. 
One reason for this interpretive strategy is supplied by e#orts to do otherwise. 
Insofar as commentators such as Harari accept the notion of a fourth register as 
something that applies to every individual, they begin to adopt anti-Freudian posi-
tions. Harari notes that:
[t]he splendour of the Wake has to do, not with metaphor, but with 
enjoyment. !is is the fundamental point about Joyce: he managed to work 
on his own enjoyment, all the while convinced that what he was producing 
was something exceptional and deserving of being recognised by the whole 
world. !is amounts to a complete reversal of the Freudian view of art 
(Harari 2002, 82). 
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But other, larger reversals loom into view with this. !e unconscious becomes radi-
cally individual, rather than formed in the intersubjective space of the discourse 
of the Other. !e faunetics of language implies mimicry, rather than entry into a 
web of di#erential relations. Individuals with complementary sinthomes can enjoy a 
sexual relation. LOM does not lack. Entirely reasonable propositions when applied 
to the individual Joyce, these become rather suspect (at a minimum, they are radi-
cally under-motivated by the clinical data) when applied to everyone. Along this, 
radical path, "nally, the global e#ectiveness of psychoanalysis is questioned, and 
with the Real, according to Harari, “Lacan sought to distance himself from what 
Freud dreamt up” (2002, 300). 
Insofar as such a catastrophic position is motivated by Lacan’s own remarks—
and I have said that they are hedged with quali"cations and conjectures, representing 
a work in progress rather than a “"nal state”—I want to draw attention in closing to 
how this is in actuality a Joycean anti-psychoanalysis. For these positions—the sus-
picion towards both Jung and Freud, the rejection of the unconscious as operating 
at any level other than the collective/mythical, the radical individual ability to tran-
scend linguistic determinations, the insistence on the possibility of a harmonious 
sexual relation, the belief that it is possible after all to fabricate a paternal signi"er 
and thereby chose one’s own destiny—are Joyce’s positions "rst and foremost. 
I suggest that this ironic reversal, where Joyce acts as a literary Sphinx that 
Lacan believes he solves, only to end up as the riddle himself, is generated by 
means of Lacan’s own strategy. Adopting a biographical approach, Lacan trembles 
on the threshold of declaring the Joycean text psychotic. He runs from this oracu-
lar determination, determined to "nd the text unreadable rather than to declare 
the author insane. !en he hesitates, not only because he is impressed by Joyce, 
but also because he is unsure how authentic this text actually is in terms of its 
testamentary value. But this is of course to state both the dilemma and its solu-
tion at the same time, for literary texts are not literal, no matter how much they 
might approach the status of letters. !ere is no contradiction between Joyce’s 
lifelong struggle against psychosis and literary genius, not just because there is 
no apriori opposition between these terms, but also for the more straightforward 
reason that a literary work is not entirely the product of authorial intentions. !e 
entire dimension of mythological structuration and references to literary father 
"gures—Homer, Dante and Shakespeare foremost—is overlooked by Lacan, who 
then ends up with something perilously close to a Joycean reading of Joyce, rather 
than a Lacanian interpretation of Ulysses and the Wake. We should be careful, I 
think, before we ascribe to this interplay of misreadings and reversals the status of 
a wholly new psychoanalytic theory.
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